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ABSTRACT
We use Census of Population microdata for 1980 and 1990 to examine the labor supply and
wages of immigrant husbands and wives in the United States in a family context. Earlier research by
Baker and Benjamin (1997) posits a family investment model in which, upon arrival, immigrant husbands
invest in their human capital while immigrant wives work to provide the family with liquidity during this
period. Consistent with this model, they find for Canada that immigrant wives work longer hours upon
arrival than comparable natives, but, with time in Canada, they are eventually overtaken by native wives.
In contrast, we find that, among immigrants to the United States, both husbands and wives work and earn
less than comparable natives upon arrival, with similar shortfalls for men and women. Further, both
immigrant husbands and wives have similar, positive assimilation profiles in wages and labor supply and
eventually overtake both the wages and the labor supply of comparable natives.
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I.  Introduction 
Most research on the labor market outcomes of immigrants has studied the behavior of 
individuals, focusing primarily on the wage assimilation process, or the excess returns to 
experience which immigrants obtain in their destination country's labor market (e.g., Barry R. 
Chiswick, 1978; George J. Borjas, 1985).  Recently, however, attention has been directed to 
analyzing immigrant labor market outcomes in a family context, an approach which combines 
information about an individual’s own labor market opportunities and the family context in 
which labor market decisions take place.  In a recent paper in this Review, Michael Baker and 
Dwayne Benjamin (1997) evaluate alternative explanations for the observed labor supply 
patterns of Canadian immigrants in the 1986-91 period.  Specifically, when immigrant husbands 
arrive in Canada, they typically work less than comparable natives; however, immigrant wives 
work more than natives, other things equal.  With assimilation, the labor supply of immigrant 
husbands eventually catches up to that of natives, while immigrant wives’ labor supply falls 
relative to comparable natives and is ultimately overtaken by that of natives.   
The authors take these patterns to be most consistent with a family investment model.  In 
this scenario, upon arrival, husbands invest in their human capital, while wives work to provide 
the family with liquidity during this investment period.  With increased time in Canada, 
husbands’ labor supply increases rapidly due to their growing skills in the Canadian labor 
market, while wives’ labor supply falls off in part because they originally took “dead-end” jobs 
upon arrival in order to finance their husbands’ investments in human capital.  Interestingly, 
although this fact goes uncommented upon, their estimated wage equations do not support their 
model—they find similar rates of wage assimilation for husbands and wives.  This does not 
match their story of dead-end jobs for wives and large human capital investments of their 
husbands. 
An alternative possible explanation examined by the authors involves a simple price 
model in which the observed labor supply patterns reflect labor supply responses to each 
spouse’s wages.  For example, the initially high but eventually falling level of wives’ labor   2
supply (relative to comparable natives) could be a response to their husbands’ initially low, but 
rising, wages.  While this reasoning, like the family investment model, is broadly consistent with 
the data, the authors conclude that the simple price model cannot be the entire explanation since, 
in order to explain the full labor supply patterns of immigrants, it would require unrealistically 
high labor supply elasticities, and, further, that the assimilation patterns noted above remain even 
when wages of husband and wife are controlled for.  The authors then go on to present a variety 
of evidence that is consistent with wives in immigrant families in Canada financing their 
husbands’ human capital investments early in their stay in Canada. 
In this paper, we use microdata from the U.S. Census of Population for 1980 and 1990 to 
examine whether these patterns characterize the experience of immigrants in the United States.  
While Baker and Benjamin cite studies by Harriet Orcutt Duleep and Seth Sanders (1993) and 
David A. McPherson and James B. Stewart (1989) for the United States that obtain results which 
they characterize as consistent with their Canadian findings, these studies are based on a single 
cross-section of data.  As Borjas (1985) showed, if the unmeasured characteristics of cohorts of 
immigrants are changing over time, as appears to be the case in the U.S., such studies may 
produce biased estimates of immigrant assimilation effects.  This problem may be mitigated by 
employing more than one nationally representative cross-section as we do here and as Baker and 
Benjamin did in their analysis of Canada.
1   
In contrast to the patterns which Baker and Benjamin (1997) found for Canada, we find 
that, among immigrants to the United States, both husbands and wives work less than 
comparable natives upon arrival.  Further, both immigrant husbands and wives have positive 
assimilation profiles in labor supply and eventually overtake the labor supply of comparable 
natives.  Both the male and female immigrant hours shortfalls upon arrival and the positive 
assimilation profiles for men and women have similar magnitudes.  It thus appears that in the 
United States the labor supply patterns of immigrant husbands and wives similarly reflect 
                                                           
1 There may however be biases in this "synthetic cohort" approach as well.  The chief concern is an alteration in the 
unmeasured composition of the group over the intervening period due say to the return migration of immigrants, or 
in our case movements into and out of the currently married category.  We return to this point below.   3
assimilation into the new country’s market.  Our results suggest that investment is indeed 
important, but that, in sharp contrast to the family investment model, both spouses seem to invest 
primarily in their own human capital rather than their spouse’s.  In this respect our findings are 
consistent with a long line of research on the growth in married women's labor supply in the 
United States which suggests that married women’s labor supply decisions are more responsive 
to their own labor market opportunities than to their husband’s income (e.g., Jacob Mincer 1962; 
Claudia Goldin 1990; and Chinhui Juhn and Kevin M. Murphy 1997).  Finally, our paper has 
significance for the Economics of Gender.  In the Baker and Benjamin (1997) model, married 
women are clearly “secondary earners” in the immigrant family.  Our results for the U.S. suggest 
more similar economic behavior of men and women within the immigrant family in that they are 
both investing in their own human capital. 
Our results imply that the extent to which the family investment model applies to 
immigrants may vary depending on such factors as the composition of the immigrant group and 
conditions in the receiving country.  While Baker and Benjamin (1997) have obtained some 
evidence suggesting that the model may hold in Canada, we have found that the model does not 
explain immigrant behavior in the United States.  Similar studies of other countries need to be 
done in order to determine whether Canada or the United States is an exceptional case.  
However, our results do imply that the family investment model is inadequate for at least one 
major immigrant-receiving country, the United States. 
 
 
II. The Labor Supply and Wage Assimilation Patterns of Married Immigrants in the 
United States 
  A.  Basic Results 
  We examine the labor market assimilation patterns of married U.S. immigrants using a 
pooled sample of married couples from the 5% Public Use Samples of the 1980 and 1990 
Censuses.  These include native couples, immigrant couples, and “mixed couples” (i.e., those   4
with one immigrant and one native spouse).  The Census is particularly suitable for analyzing 
immigrant outcomes because of its large sample size (while immigration has been increasing 
rapidly, immigrants remained a relatively small proportion of population in 1980 and 1990) and 
its information on race and ethnicity, as well as on the source countries of immigrants.  In order 
to focus on differences between outcomes in the United States and Canada, we follow the 
specifications and sample restrictions in Baker and Benjamin’s (1997) Canadian study as closely 
as possible.
2  The entire 5% sample is used for couples including immigrants, nonwhites, and 
Hispanics, but a random sample was employed for couples where both spouses were native 
whites.
3  In all the analyses reported below, observations are weighted to represent the U.S. 
population.  Our weighting also takes into account Census sampling weights which are available 
for 1990 but not provided by the Census for 1980.  Results were very similar when we ran 
unweighted regressions.  
To analyze labor supply, we estimate the following equation on the pooled sample of 
married immigrants and married natives separately for wives and husbands: 
 
(1)   Hit = B′Xit + ΣcγWc + ΣcγHc + a1YSMWit + a2(YSMWit)
2 + b1YSMHit  
+ b2(YSMHit)
2 + kt + uit, 
 
where for individual i in year t (t=1980 or 1990), H is annual hours worked in the previous year 
(usual weekly hours * weeks worked, including those who did not work outside the home), γWc 
and γHc are immigrant cohort-of-arrival effects referring to cohort c for wives and husbands, 
respectively, YSMW and YSMH are years since migration for immigrant wives and immigrant 
                                                           
2  Following Baker and Benjamin, we restrict the sample to those couples in which both members are aged 16-64 
and exclude the self-employed and individuals with positive wage and salary income but implausible values of 
wages (in our case, less than $1 or greater than $250 in 1989 dollars using the Personal Consumption Expenditures 
deflator).  Also, as is standard in research examining immigrant outcomes in the United States or using U.S. Census 
data to study wages, we exclude natives born abroad, at sea or in U.S. territories, individuals who are in the military, 
and those with allocated wage and salary income.  Note that this is a sample of married couples.  Thus, if one 
member of the couple did not meet the sample inclusion restrictions, both were excluded.   
3  This sample corresponded to 2/1000 of the U.S. population.   5
husbands, respectively, but equal 0 for natives, k is a common year effect, X is a vector of 
control variables to be discussed shortly, and u is an error term. 
  In equation (1), immigrants and natives are pooled.  We define the cohort of arrival 
dummy variables (whose coefficients are the γs) to include each possible arrival cohort as coded 
in the Census:  1985-89, 1980-84, 1975-79, 1970-74, 1965-69, 1960-64, 1950-59, and pre-1950.  
Thus the sum of the wife (husband) cohort dummies in the wife (husband) labor supply equation 
would be identical to an immigrant dummy variable, which therefore is not separately included 
in (1).  The equation allows each spouse’s arrival cohort (if either spouse is an immigrant) to 
affect the labor supply behavior of both spouses.  In addition, the years since migration (YSMW 
and YSMH) variables allow us to estimate assimilation profiles with respect to the individual's 
own time in the U.S. as well as his or her spouse’s time, if either spouse is an immigrant.
4  The 
pooled sample across two Census years and the assumption of a common time effect for 
immigrants and natives together allow us to separately identify immigrant cohort and 
assimilation effects (Borjas, 1985).
5 
  The combination of the cohort dummies and the assimilation effects allows us to 
completely characterize immigrant labor supply over time starting with arrival in the U.S. of any 
arrival cohort relative to that of natives, controlling for the X variables and the time effect.  The 
X variables include quadratics in age for both the husband and wife, years of schooling for both 
husband and wife, English language ability indicators (speaking English “well,” “not well” or 
“not at all”, with native English speakers as the omitted category) for both husband and wife, 
number of children, a dummy variable for the presence of children less than six years old, three 
race/ethnicity dummy variables for husband and wife (black, other nonwhite, and Hispanic, with 
white non-Hispanic the omitted category), a metropolitan area dummy variable, and regional 
                                                           
4  Following Borjas (1995), we calculated the years since migration variables by evaluating the categorical period of 
immigration variables at the midpoints of the indicated intervals and used 40 years in 1980 and 50 years in 1990 for 
the open-ended category (before 1950). 
5  Of course, the common time effect may not hold to the extent that immigrants have different skill levels from 
natives.  In our context, this factor could produce problems comparing the U.S. and Canada to the extent that 
immigrants’ relative skill levels differ in the two countries.  This point is pursued further below.   6
dummy variables to account for the nine Census regions.  Other than the control for 
race/ethnicity, the specification is very similar to that of Baker and Benjamin (1997), and 
omitting these variables from our equations did not affect the basic results.
6 
Log-wage equations had a similar form to (1) except that, following Baker and Benjamin 
(1997), no spouse cohort or assimilation variables were included.  These were omitted by the 
authors in order to focus on individuals’ own determinants of wage growth, while the labor 
supply equations emphasize family considerations.
7  Wages were defined as the previous year’s 
wage and salary income divided by (weeks worked * usual weekly work hours) and were 
expressed in 1989 dollars. 
  Table 1a contains basic regression results for work hours and wages from reduced form 
models.  Overall, in contrast to Baker and Benjamin’s (1997) Canadian results, we obtain similar 
wage and labor supply assimilation patterns for immigrant husbands and wives in the U.S.  
Consider first the results for the labor supply equation for wives.  We find that the coefficients 
on the years since migration (YSM) and cohort variables are similarly signed to the results 
obtained for Canada by Baker and Benjamin; however, there are some crucial differences in their 
magnitudes.  As in the case of Canada, the annual hours of immigrant women increase with 
wife’s own time in the U.S. (through 30.3 years)
8 and decrease with her husband's.  However, 
while the coefficient on wife’s own YSM is similar in magnitude to the coefficient estimated for 
Canada, the effect for her husband’s YSM is small and insignificant.  Similarly, while the impact 
of a woman's own cohort variables are all negative and of her husband's positive (with one 
exception), estimated husband's cohort effects are considerably smaller in magnitude in the U.S. 
than in Canada.  Signs are also similar for the YSM and cohort variables of immigrant husbands 
in the U.S. and Canada.  Both own and wives’ cohort effects are negative; and immigrant 
                                                           
6  Baker and Benjamin (1997) were unable to include controls for race and ethnicity in their analysis because this 
information was not available in their data, the 1986 and 1991 Canadian Survey of Consumer Finances.   
7  While we recognize that the family investment model implies that spouse’s time in the U.S. affects one’s own 
human capital, we use Baker and Benjamin’s (1997) specification for comparability.  Note that, following Baker 
and Benjamin, we include spouse’s time in the U.S. and cohort variables when we examine results for immigrant 
and mixed families separately below.  Inclusion of these variables does not alter our findings. 
8  Mean YSM of immigrant wives is 16.344.   7
husbands are found to increase their hours worked with both their own YSM (through 33.0 
years) and their wives’ YSM (through 30.4 years).
9  As in the case of Canada, own effects are 
larger than cross effects, although cross effects are found to be a bit larger in the U.S. than in 
Canada. 
The net effects of the estimated YSM and cohort effects on the hours assimilation 
profiles of immigrant wives and husbands are illustrated in Table 1b for immigrant couples 
where both the wife and the husband arrived between 1975 and 1979.  Results are qualitatively 
similar for other cohorts.  Relative to natives with similar characteristics, we find that immigrant 
wives supply 212.7 fewer hours upon arrival (i.e. –264.592 + 51.897); and immigrant husbands 
389.7 fewer hours.  The assimilation effects for men and women both imply rising annual hours 
worked relative to comparable natives with time in the U.S., with immigrant wives overtaking 
native-born wives after 10-15 years, and immigrant husbands surpass native-born husbands after 
about 15 years.  The hours assimilation profile is concave for both groups.   
The U.S.-Canada comparison is clarified in Figure 1 which shows the hours assimilation 
profiles summarized in Table 1b for the U.S. and analogous results for Canada derived from 
Baker and Benjamin (1997).  We focus on hypothetical immigrant married couples that migrated 
at roughly the same time, where the base immigration entry cohort is assumed to be 1975-79 for 
the U.S. and 1976-80 for Canada.  The Figure shows that our results for immigrant husbands are 
similar to those obtained for Canada by Baker and Benjamin; however, our results differ sharply 
for immigrant wives.  Their results imply that, in Canada, immigrant wives work more than 
comparable natives upon arrival but that hours converge smoothly until reaching parity after 30 
years.  In contrast, as noted, immigrant wives in the U.S. initially have lower hours but 
eventually surpass hours of comparable natives.  Note also the qualitatively similar profiles for 
immigrant husbands and wives in the U.S. 
  To assess the magnitudes of the assimilation and cohort entry effects for immigrant 
husbands and wives in the United States, recall that the dependent variable is annual hours 
                                                           
9  Mean YSM of immigrant husbands is 16.902.   8
worked.
10  In our pooled sample, the weighted means for annual hours (including those not 
employed) averaged 1038.3 for wives and 1961.0 for husbands.
11  If we convert the parameter 
values into elasticities evaluated at these means using the results in Table 1b for the 1975-79 
cohort, we find that the labor supply behavior of immigrant husbands and wives relative to 
comparable natives is very similar, both at arrival and over time in the U.S.  At arrival, wives 
work 20.5% less than the average, all else equal, while husbands work 19.9% less.  Over the next 
25 years, immigrant wives increase their labor supply relative to comparable natives by 28.1% of 
the sample average, while immigrant husbands raise theirs by 26.4%.   
The results in Table 1a indicate that, in the U.S., wage assimilation profiles are also 
similar for immigrant husbands and wives.  Evaluating these results for the 1975/79 cohort in 
Table 1c shows that both groups start 12-15% below comparable natives.  But, after 25 years, 
immigrant wives have moved up 18.9%, while immigrant husbands’ wages have increased 
19.4% relative to comparable natives.  Like the hours profiles (at least considered as elasticities), 
the log wage profiles for husbands and wives display similar concavity.  Interestingly, Figure 2 
shows that our wage results are similar to those of Baker and Benjamin (1997) in that they also 
find similar wage assimilation profiles for immigrant husbands and wives.  This suggests that 
some investment activity by both husbands and wives in their own human capital occurs in both 
countries.  Moreover, the similarity of the wage assimilation profiles for husbands and wives in 
Canada (and our own findings for the U.S.) does not suggest that women are taking dead-end 
jobs to finance their husbands’ human capital investments.  And, although wages increase 
considerably more rapidly with time in the receiving country for immigrant husbands in Canada 
than in the U.S., the same is true for immigrant wives.
12  This suggests that the steeper slope of 
                                                           
10  We use hours instead of log hours because we retain those with zero hours (i.e., the non-employed) in the 
analysis. 
11  Annual work hours were 7-12% higher among natives than immigrants.  For example, annual work hours 
averaged 934.4 hours for wives and 1844.8 hours for husbands among immigrants; and 1048.1 for wives and 
1971.14 for husbands among natives.  Because the means for immigrants and natives are fairly close, we would 
obtain similar qualitative conclusions about elasticities using immigrant, native or pooled means. 
12  Evaluated at the mean YSM in the U.S. of 16.623, the return to an additional year in the receiving country is 
.0063 for wives and .0070 for husbands in the U.S., and .0140 for wives and .0124 for husbands in Canada.   9
immigrant husbands’ wage profiles in Canada compared to the U.S. is not necessarily due to the 
financing of their human capital investments by their wives.
13   
In Table 2, we present structural labor supply equations where we include own and 
spouse’s wages or estimated wage offers, as well as the couple’s asset income, to see whether 
responses to these variables can account for the assimilation patterns which we observe in Tables 
1a and b.  Following Baker and Benjamin (1997) and Juhn and Murphy (1997), we impute wage 
offers to those without jobs by predicting log wages from a regression on a sample of those who 
worked less than 20 weeks in the previous year (estimated separately by gender).
14  Table 2 
shows ordinary least squares (OLS) and two stage least squares (2SLS) results, where in the 
latter, following Baker and Benjamin, own and spouse’s wage offers are instrumented using the 
gender-specific decile in which one’s wage offer (actual or predicted in the case of non-workers) 
falls.  This instrumental variable procedure can potentially correct for measurement error in the 
wage variables, since error is likely to be much less frequent in measuring wage decile than 
actual wages.
15   
                                                           
13  It is possible that the assumption of a common time effect for immigrants and natives has a larger negative effect 
on immigrants’ wage assimilation profiles in the U.S. than in Canada.  Specifically, according to Borjas (1993), 
immigrants are less skilled relative to natives in the U.S. than in Canada.  Further, it appears that the fortunes of the 
less-skilled generally declined by more in the U.S. than in Canada in the 1980s (Richard B. Freeman and Karen 
Needels, 1993).  Then if, as is necessary to account for immigrant cohort effects, we assume a common time effect, 
this may cause us to understate true immigrant assimilation profiles by more in the U.S. than in Canada.  That is, the 
more negative immigrant time effect in the U.S. becomes a less steeply sloped assimilation profile in a model that 
forces a common time effect (this is similar to the argument made by Robert J. LaLonde and Robert H. Topel 
(1992) in assessing male immigrant wage assimilation in the U.S. in the 1980s).  While a similar point may apply to 
the hours analyses as well, these relative biases cannot explain the divergent profiles for Canadian and U.S. 
immigrant wives shown in Figure 1.  If anything, true U.S. immigrant women’s employment assimilation profiles 
are even more positively sloped relative to those in Canada than Figure 1 indicates. 
14  This regression included the respondent’s age, age squared, own and spouse’s education, a metropolitan area 
indicator, regional dummies, a year effect, race/ethnicity, and own cohort dummies for immigrants.  This 
specification is similar to Baker and Benjamin’s, except for our inclusion of cohort dummies for immigrants (made 
possible by our larger sample size) and the addition of race.  Due to an insufficient number of immigrants in the 
sample of individuals working less than 20 weeks, Baker and Benjamin obtain cohort effects from wage regressions 
using the sample of all working individuals. As noted above, Baker and Benjamin omit race/ethnicity from their 
analyses because it was not available in their data; recall that omitting race/ethnicity did not affect our results. 
15  While it is true that measurement error in wage deciles is less frequent than in actual levels, the consequences of 
making an error in denoting one’s decile are likely to be greater than the consequences of a small measurement error 
in actual wage levels.  For example, wrongly classifying a 9
th decile worker as an 8
th decile earner implies an error 
as large in log points as the difference between log wages in the 9
th vs. the 8
th deciles.  Thus, the wage decile 
instrument may not adequately correct for measurement error in actual wages.  Note that whatever the merit of this 
instrument, the OLS and 2SLS results in Table 2 are very similar.   10
The key findings in Table 2 are that, even controlling for wages, there are comparable 
positive hours assimilation profiles for immigrant husbands and wives.  And, among immigrant 
couples in the same cohort, both husbands and wives are estimated to start out below comparable 
natives in work hours, controlling for wages, family asset income, period and the control 
variables.  In contrast, using a similar specification, Baker and Benjamin continue to find that, 
among families that immigrated together, wives start out working more than comparable natives, 
but have negative assimilation profiles.  They take their results to imply that simple labor supply 
models cannot account for their data.  Our results similarly suggest that a simple labor supply 
model cannot account for our findings, but in the case of the U.S. it appears that the primary 
pattern is for both immigrant wives and husbands to invest in their own human capital.  We note 
however that one interpretation of our results, as well as those of Baker and Benjamin, is that 
time in the U.S. provides additional information about labor market opportunities, even 
controlling for wages.
16 
A final point meriting comment in results presented in Tables 1a and 2 is the estimated 
positive effect of wife’s YSM on husband’s labor supply in all the models estimated.  As noted 
above, Baker and Benjamin obtain the same result but in their case there is a ready interpretation 
for this finding.  Wives are found to scale back their labor supply with time in Canada and hence 
it makes sense that husband's labor supply is increasing in wife's YSM.  How can we explain our 
result in the face of rising wife’s labor supply and wages with own YSM?  It is possible that this 
positive coefficient is the result of greater information that the wife brings to her partner with 
additional time in the U.S., thus furthering his assimilation process.  However, if that is the case, 
                                                           
16  Note that, in addition to the YSM variables, a number of the control variables, including husband’s and wife’s 
education and presence of children, may capture some of the effects of wages on labor supply.  For the wives’ 
results in Table 2, the coefficient on wife’s own log wage (WW) is smaller in absolute value than the coefficient on 
husband’s log wage (WH) in both the OLS and 2SLS regressions.  This is counter to expectations based on the labor 
supply literature cited above in which wives were found to be more responsive to their own wage opportunities than 
to their husband’s income.  However, when we estimated more conventional models we found the expected results.  
For example, when the models in Table 2 were reestimated continuing to include the YSM and immigrant cohort 
variables but omitting own and husband’s education and presence of children, the estimated coefficients and 
standard errors were 338.969 (2.303) for WW and –236.5 (2.149) for WH in the OLS specification and 504.777 
(3.402) for WW and –334.854 (3.563) for WH in the 2SLS specification.   11
we would expect to find a similar positive effect of husband’s YSM on wife’s labor supply.  The 
fact that we find no evidence of this might be taken as indirect evidence in support of the family 
investment model.  That is, it may be that the positive information effect of husband’s YSM on 
wife's hours is offset by the wife’s reduction in her labor supply as her husband accumulates 
human capital and no longer needs her contribution to family liquidity.  However, if wives 
undertake such a role to some extent in the U.S., our evidence strongly suggests that the 
dominant pattern for immigrant husbands and wives is a simple process of human capital 
accumulation:  both husbands and wives start with low wages and low hours but both have 
positive assimilation profiles, and the magnitudes of these effects are similar for husbands and 
wives.  
Further evidence on the family investment model is provided in Tables 3 and 4 which 
show results for the labor supply and wages separately for wives and husbands in immigrant 
families (i.e. where both spouses are immigrants) and mixed families (i.e. where only one spouse 
is an immigrant).
17  This analysis follows that of Baker and Benjamin who reasoned that a mixed 
family would be less liquidity constrained than an immigrant family.  They found that immigrant 
wives in mixed families behaved much less according to the family investment model than those 
in immigrant families.  Specifically, immigrant wives in mixed families worked less than 
comparable natives upon arrival in Canada but had a positive assimilation profile, while 
immigrant wives in immigrant families generally worked more than comparable natives upon 
arrival, but had negative assimilation profiles. 
In contrast to Baker and Benjamin, the results for the U.S. shown in Table 3 indicate that 
immigrant wives in both types of family work significantly less than comparable natives upon 
arrival and both have significantly positively sloped hours assimilation profiles.  The hours 
shortfall at arrival relative to natives is generally smaller in mixed than in immigrant families, 
and the hours assimilation profile is more steeply sloped for wives in immigrant than in mixed 
                                                           
17  These results are estimated in regression equations specified as in (1), which include separate assimilation and 
cohort variables for immigrant husbands and wives in immigrant and mixed families.   12
families.  These two contrasts could reflect a lower initial level of human capital and labor 
market knowledge among immigrant wives in immigrant than in mixed families.  This 
interpretation is bolstered by the wage results in Table 3.  Specifically, while immigrant wives in 
both types of families start below comparable natives, the effects are much smaller in absolute 
value in mixed families, and the wage assimilation profile is much flatter in mixed families as 
well.  The findings in Table 3 are not consistent with the idea that immigrant wives in immigrant 
families behave more according to the family investment model than those in mixed families. 
Table 4 shows that the same patterns characterize immigrant husbands as immigrant 
wives in mixed versus immigrant families.  For both husbands and wives, being married to a 
native is generally associated with a higher initial level of hours and wages and less steeply 
sloped assimilation profiles than being married to an immigrant.  Indeed, perhaps surprisingly, 
we show no evidence of wage assimilation for immigrant husbands in mixed families—we return 
to this point below. 
Table 5 shows results for some direct measures of husband’s human capital investment 
and wife’s role in financing this investment.  First, the table shows that, upon arrival, immigrant 
husbands in immigrant families are more likely to be in school than comparable natives, but over 
time, this difference decays.  This matches Baker and Benjamin’s findings for Canada and 
suggests front-loading of immigrant husband’s human capital investment upon arrival in the 
United States.  While this is consistent with the family investment model, such front-loading 
would of course also be predicted by human capital models applied to individual investment 
behavior (Becker, 1975).  The latter seems a better explanation of our results in that, in contrast 
to Baker and Benjamin, we find similar results for immigrant husbands in mixed families, while 
for Canada, they found that husbands in mixed families were usually less likely to attend school 
than natives and had positive school attendance assimilation profiles.  Moreover, again in   13
contrast to the results for Canada, we find no evidence that wives’ assimilation drives the excess 
enrollment decrease of men in immigrant families.
18 
Evidence on childbirth patterns can also shed light on the role of wives in financing their 
husbands’ school attendance.  If immigrant wives in immigrant families are more likely to be 
performing this role than those in mixed families, then we expect the latter to front-load their 
childbearing to a greater degree than the former and indeed Baker and Benjamin found evidence 
that this was the case in Canada.  However, the results in Table 5 are not consistent with this 
scenario.  Specifically, relative to natives, the presence of young children (a proxy for recent 
childbearing) appears to be more front-loaded for immigrant than for mixed families.  While 
husbands are clearly investing in human capital relatively intensively upon arrival, there is little 




B.  Alternative Specifications:  Age at Immigration and Region-of-Origin Effects 
 
Up to now we have attempted to replicate as closely as possible Baker and Benjamin’s 
specifications and have found that, in contrast to their results for Canada, immigrant wives in the 
United States appear to follow similar human capital accumulation patterns relative to natives as 
their husbands.  In this section, we determine whether these results hold up to alternative 
specifications.  We first consider issues relating to the age at which individuals migrated to the 
U.S., and second, whether our results could be explained by region-of-origin effects, which were 
not included in (1). 
                                                           
18  The individual husband and wife YSM (and YSM
2) effects are roughly similar in magnitude though none are 
significant.  The net YSM (and YSM
2) effects are however significant and consistent with a reduction in school 
attendance with years in the U.S. (through 19.5 years). 
19  In an examination of immigrant-native differences in total fertility (i.e., children ever born), Blau (1992) found 
evidence for the 1970-80 period, that women’s fertility tended to be disrupted by immigration.  That is, upon 
arrival, immigrant women had fewer children than otherwise similar natives but that children increased relative to 
similar natives with time in the U.S.  The results in Table 5 suggest the possibility that this pattern may no longer 
hold although it is possible that the positive coefficient on most of the cohort variables for presence of young 
children reflects an attempt by immigrants whose fertility has been disrupted to attain their desired family size.   14
Regarding the impact of age at migration, in our full sample of immigrants, some will 
have arrived in the U.S. as children and will have attained age 16, and therefore eligibility for 
our sample, some time between 1980 and 1990.  While equation (1) relies on within-cohort 
changes to estimate assimilation effects, we do not observe a true within-cohort change in labor 
supply for those who recently arrived as children because they are not in the 1980 sample.  More 
generally, results including those migrating to the U.S. as children may be misleading to some 
extent since they are more like Americans when they reach adulthood than those migrating as 
adults.  To address these issues, following Rachel M. Friedberg (1993) and Borjas (1995), we 
have re-estimated all of our models on a sample of immigrants who migrated to the U.S. at age 
18 or older.
20   
Representative results for the adult immigrant sample are shown in Tables 6 and 7, and 
are similar in most respects to the corresponding Tables 3 and 4 for the sample including all 
immigrants.  Specifically, immigrant wives and immigrant husbands who came to the U.S. when 
they were at least 18 both work less than comparable natives upon arrival, regardless of whether 
they are in an immigrant family or a mixed family.  The effects are stronger for immigrant 
families than mixed families among men, while the relative magnitude of cohort of arrival 
effects for women between immigrant and mixed families are ambiguous.
21  Moreover, 
immigrant husbands and wives in both types of families have positively sloped hours 
assimilation profiles, with stronger effects for immigrant families than mixed families. 
Regarding wages, Table 6 shows that immigrant wives who came to the U.S. as adults 
have significantly positively sloped assimilation profiles regardless of family type, with a steeper 
slope for those in immigrant than in mixed families.  Moreover, immigrant wives in immigrant 
families usually start with lower wages relative to comparable natives than those in mixed 
families.  These findings are very similar to those in Table 3, although we now find stronger 
                                                           
20  To implement this sample selection, we evaluated the categorical period of immigration variables as in our 
computation of the YSM variables. 
21  For some cohorts, the cohort dummies are more negative for wives in immigrant families, while, for other 
cohorts, the effects are more negative for wives in mixed families.   15
evidence of positive wage assimilation in mixed families.  Immigrant husbands who came to the 
U.S. as adults now have wage patterns that are similar across the immigrant and mixed families 
(Table 7).  Specifically, they start with low wages and have positively sloped assimilation 
profiles, and these effects are of similar magnitude across the two family types.  It is possible 
that restricting the sample to adults has led to improved estimates of the wage profile for 
husbands and wives in mixed families because the latter may be more likely to include child 
immigrants.  But, overall, our conclusion that wives appear to be investing in a similar manner to 
husbands (all relative to natives) is valid even restricting the immigrant sample to those who 
migrated as adults. 
One possible reason for the differences we have obtained in the behavior of immigrant 
families in the U.S. compared to Baker and Benjamin’s findings for Canada is that the U.S. and 
Canadian immigrants tend to come from different source countries and there may be behavioral 
differences associated with country of origin.
22 For example, it is possible that female 
immigrants to the U.S. come from areas where women are more prone to invest in their own 
human capital than female immigrants to Canada.  To investigate this possibility, we estimated 
the labor supply model in equation (1) and the associated wage equation separately for 
immigrants from each major world region.  The regions were:  Europe, North America, South 
America, Central America, the Caribbean, Africa, Asia, and Oceania, where region was defined 
by the focal individual (i.e. wife or husband). 
Our region-by-region series of regressions of immigrants versus natives showed results 
very similar to those in Table 1.  First, husbands and wives who migrated at the same time had 
positively sloped, concave hours assimilation profiles for both husbands and wives within a 
region.  Second, both husbands and wives within a region usually showed positive wage 
assimilation profiles.
23  Finally, in almost every case, both husbands and wives started below 
                                                           
22  For example, European immigrants are a larger share of the total in Canada than in the U.S.  For further evidence 
on U.S.-Canadian differences in source countries, see Borjas (1993). Since Baker and Benjamin’s data did not 
include information on source country, they were unable to examine region-of-origin effects. 
23  Exceptions were negatively-sloped profiles for husbands and wives from Central America and husbands from 
Oceania.   16
comparable natives upon arrival in the U.S. with respect to hours and wages.
24  Since our basic 
findings characterize almost all cohorts for every region, even if immigrants to the United States 
came from the same regions in the same proportions as those in Canada, we would have obtained 
results similar to the ones presented here in Table 1.
25  
 
C.  Qualifications and Possible Explanations 
 
  The results we have presented suggest that for the United States, immigrant husbands and 
wives appear to invest similarly in their own human capital with time in the U.S.  Our results are 
not consistent with the family investment model, and contrast strongly with Baker and 
Benjamin’s (1997) evidence in support of that model for Canada.  However, there are some 
potential problems with the data and the empirical analysis that potentially apply to both studies 
which deserve serious consideration.   
First, with the exception of recent arrivals, in neither the Canadian nor the U.S. data are 
we able to observe marital status at the time of arrival in the receiving country.  Hypothetical 
assimilation profiles for married couples are constructed on the assumption that all currently-
observed married couples were married to each other for their entire stay in the U.S. or in 
Canada.  To the extent that this assumption does not hold, the inferences made about 
assimilation profiles may be incorrect.  Essentially, the problem is that the composition of the 
married populations may shift over time.
26  However, it should be pointed out that for those in 
                                                           
24  There were three exceptions: Central America where, for some cohorts, husbands and wives worked more or 
earned more on arrival than comparable natives, and for other cohorts, they earned or worked less; wives from the 
Caribbean who had some positive and some negative hours arrival effects for different cohorts; and both husbands 
and wives from North America who had some positive and some negative wage arrival effects for different cohorts. 
25  We also re-estimated the labor supply and wage equations including a full set of husband and wife country-of-
origin dummy variables.  There were 87 country dummies, resulting in a total of 174 additional variables included 
in the labor supply equations and 87 in the wage equations.  The results for the cohort and assimilation variables 
were very similar to those in Table 1a. 
26  Some well-known longitudinal data sets such as the National Longitudinal Surveys or the Michigan Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics allow one to observe marital status over time.  However, concerns about sample size and the 
representativeness of the immigrant subsamples in these data files reduce their usefulness for our purposes 
compared to the Census.   17
the most recent cohort, we do observe marital status close to the time of entry in the receiving 
country.
27  Thus, our basic finding that U.S. immigrant men and women start out with work hours 
below that of comparable natives, and by similar percentages, is likely to be accurate, as are 
Baker and Benjamin’s (1997) findings that Canadian immigrant wives start out with hours 
greater than comparable native wives’ and that immigrant husbands begin with hours below 
those of comparable native husbands.  Moreover, a related study by Edward Funkhouser (2000) 
found that both male and female immigrants to the United States initially have lower 
employment rates then natives, but that employment rates tend to converge after 6-10 years in 
the country.  While he did not look explicitly at the family context (i.e., did not focus on married 
women or examine the impact of spouse's characteristics), Funkhouser’s findings provide us 
with some confidence that the assimilation pattern which we observe for married immigrant 
women is not due to selection into the currently married category. 
Second, as we have seen, Baker and Benjamin estimated structural labor supply models 
to assess the simple labor supply hypothesis as an alternative to the family investment model in 
explaining the hours assimilation profiles they estimated.  One can, however, question the 
estimation strategy for these labor supply models.  In particular, the authors do not take account 
of the endogeneity of husband’s and wife’s wages which is implied by the human capital 
investment and family investment models,
28 and they also treat asset income (which is clearly 
affected by wages) as exogenous.  Thus, the true magnitudes of the wage elasticities and the 
assimilation profiles controlling for wages may be different from those estimated by Baker and 
Benjamin for Canada and those that we estimated for the U.S.  However, Baker and Benjamin 
make the reasonable argument that in order for the labor supply model to explain their reduced 
form assimilation patterns, the required elasticities would be implausibly high in absolute value.  
Thus, the likelihood that an appropriate treatment of these endogeneities (with suitable 
                                                           
27 There may be some individuals who move into or out of the married category during this brief time interval, but 
this is likely to be a fairly small group. 
28  Recall that wages are instrumented by wage decile to account for measurement error, a procedure that does not 
take into account these sources of endogeneity.   18
instruments) would lead to labor supply elasticities that could completely explain the Canadian 
hours assimilation patterns is small.   
In our case, we find in reduced form analyses for immigrants to the U.S. that husbands 
and wives have similar hours and similar wage assimilation profiles (Table 1).  For labor supply 
responses to completely explain the reduced form results in Table 1, the following labor supply 
elasticities (evaluated at the sample mean hours and time in the U.S.) are required:  own wage 
elasticities of 0.878 for husbands and 1.703 for wives; cross wage elasticities for 0.332 for 
husbands and -0.525 for wives.
29  The required own wage elasticities are larger than those 
reported in Richard Blundell and Thomas MaCurdy’s (1999) review of labor supply studies.  
These ranged from -0.25 to 0.25 for men with most studies showing an elasticity of less than 0.1 
in absolute value and .05 to 2.03 for married women, with 16 of the 17 studies cited having an 
elasticity of 1.18 or below.  Regarding the cross-elasticities, the positive required value for men 
(.332) is counter to the vast majority of studies showing negative income effects for men 
(Blundell and MaCurdy 1999).  For women, the required cross-elasticity of -0.525 is larger in 
absolute value than the income effect in every study cited by Blundell and MaCurdy, the vast 
majority of which ranged from -0.1 to -0.3.
30  Thus, as was the case for Canada, the pure labor 
supply model implies parameter values that are implausible and thus is unlikely to be the full 
explanation for the hours profiles of U.S. immigrants. 
We also note that for the family investment model to have any explanatory power in 
Canada, it is necessary for the labor supply model to explain less than the full pattern of 
immigrant wives’ labor supply there—i.e. the negative hours assimilation profile.  And Baker 
and Benjamin do indeed conclude that this is the case.  In the U.S., the labor supply model also 
explains less than the full pattern of immigrant wives’ labor supply assimilation.  However, in 
                                                           
29  These elasticities are computed as (∂ln(Hours)/∂ln(YSM))/(∂ln(Wages)/∂ln(YSM)). 
30  The required cross-wage elasticity of -0.525 for women is the same as the required income elasticity if all of the 
family’s income is earned by the husband.  If the wife is working or if there is nonlabor income, then a cross-wage 
elasticity of -0.525 implies an income elasticity even larger in absolute value, since a given percentage change in the 
husband’s wage entails a smaller percentage change in family income, which is the denominator of the income 
elasticity.   19
this case, the hours assimilation profile is positively sloped.  The fact that wives’ hours 
assimilation profiles are more steeply sloped than may be explained by the response to own and 
spouse wages is counter to the family investment model.  Only if conventional labor supply 
parameters predicted a steeper than observed hours assimilation profile for immigrant women in 
the U.S. could we say that the assimilation profile of immigrant wives in the U.S. is what would 
be expected based on the family investment model.  And of course we find exactly the opposite. 
If simple labor supply models are not the entire explanation for Baker and Benjamin’s 
(1997) Canadian hours assimilation and wage profiles and those we have found for the U.S., 
what can explain the differences between immigrant labor supply patterns in the two countries?  
First, we note that although U.S. immigration policy is more tilted toward admitting immigrants 
with low skills than Canadian policy, this difference is unlikely to explain our results.  
Specifically, Borjas (1993) finds that the relative skills of immigrants coming from the same 
country are similar in Canada and the U.S., implying that the overall difference in skills of 
immigrants in the two countries is entirely due to country of origin.  Since we find similar results 
for each region of origin, different immigrant skill levels are not likely to explain the differences 
between our results and those of Baker and Benjamin. 
Second, Baker and Benjamin used a 1986-91 window to identify their immigrant 
assimilation profiles and cohort effects, while we used a 1980-90 window.  On the one hand, a 
shorter window means that there are fewer unmeasured effects that may change over time than a 
longer window.  On the other hand, the closer the end points of one’s interval (i.e., the shorter 
the period), the more like a single cross-section one’s data becomes, limiting one’s ability to 
separately identify cohort and assimilation effects.  In any case, this difference in the data may 
help to explain our results.  Note that we have used the Census rather than other microdata bases 
such as the Current Population Survey because the Census has far more observations on 
immigrants. 
Third, Canada has greater union coverage and much more generous social insurance 
programs than the United States (David Card and Freeman, 1993).  While it is not obvious how   20
these differences could explain why the family investment model appears to work better in 
Canada than in the U.S., there could be a connection between such institutional features of the 
economy and immigrant behavior. 
Finally, we note that our tabulations based on the 1994-96 International Adult Literacy 
Survey (IALS) microdata, ever-married immigrant women were more likely to be currently 
widowed or divorced both absolutely and relative to natives in the U.S. than in Canada.
31  
Specifically, among 16-65 year old ever-married native women, the percentage currently married 
was 79.1% in the U.S. and 81.6% in Canada; however, among ever-married immigrant women, 
72.4% were currently married in the U.S., compared to 83.0% in Canada.  These differences 
were not explained by relative age, schooling or adult literacy differences between immigrants in 
Canada and those in the U.S. (Blau, Kahn, Moriarty and Souza, 2000).  Thus, immigrant 
women’s marriages in the U.S. are overall more fragile than those in Canada.  It is possible that 
the greater anticipated likelihood of being on one’s own in the U.S. leads women to invest in 
their own human capital to a greater degree than immigrant women in Canada.
32  Of course, 
immigrant wives and husbands investing in their own human capital to a similar extent in the 
U.S. and following a family investment model in Canada could be the cause of, rather than a 
response to, the observed differences in marital stability. 
 
III.  Conclusions 
 
  This paper has examined the wage and labor supply assimilation patterns of immigrant 
husbands and wives in the United States in 1980 and 1990.  We find that, upon arrival in the 
U.S., both immigrant husbands and wives earn and work less than comparable natives, with 
comparable shortfalls for men and women.  However, with time in the U.S., the wage rates and 
                                                           
31  The IALS is the result of an international cooperative effort; for a further description.  For a description, see 
OECD (1998). 
32 For evidence of the impact of divorce rates on married women’s labor force supply, see William R. Johnson and 
Jonathan Skinner (1986).   21
work hours of both immigrant husbands and wives increase to a similar extent and eventually 
overtake those of comparable natives.  It thus appears that husbands and wives are investing 
equally in their human capital. 
  These patterns for women contrast sharply with those of Baker and Benjamin (1997) for 
Canada over the 1986-91 period.  They found that, upon arrival in Canada, immigrant wives 
worked more than natives but that this advantage declined with time in the country.  Immigrant 
husbands, however, had the same pattern we found for the U.S.:  they started below natives in 
their labor supply but eventually caught up.  These results were interpreted as consistent with a 
family investment model in which immigrant wives initially work to finance their husbands’ 
human capital investments but then reduce their labor force commitment (relative to comparable 
natives) when this investment is completed.   
Our results for the United States give little support for the family investment model and 
suggest that the primary pattern in the U.S. is for both immigrant wives and husbands to invest in 
their own human capital.  The broader significance of our findings is that the extent to which the 
family investment model prevails for immigrants is likely to vary with the composition of the 
immigrant group and the circumstances in the receiving country.  We have found that for at least 
one major country, the United States, this model is inadequate to explain immigrant assimilation 
patterns.  
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Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
YSM, wife (x100 for 
log wage) 25.207 2.170 9.473 1.845 1.1410 0.1300
YSM
2, wife (x100 
for log wage) -0.416 0.036 -0.156 0.031 -0.0154 0.0024
YSM, husband 
(x100 for log wage) -2.054 2.233 24.323 1.898 0.9950 0.1040
YSM
2, husband 
(x100 for log wage) -0.043 0.036 -0.368 0.031 -0.0088 0.0019
IM8589, wife -609.353 16.314 -80.765 13.839 -0.2731 0.0113
IM8084, wife -251.208 19.873 -95.234 16.879 -0.1630 0.0133
IM7579, wife -264.592 19.893 -122.841 16.939 -0.1153 0.0125
IM7074, wife -180.993 25.203 -78.472 21.457 -0.0788 0.0151
IM6569, wife -244.220 30.786 -94.549 26.197 -0.0946 0.0182
IM6064, wife -317.414 34.934 -98.459 29.722 -0.1353 0.0208
IM5059, wife -340.645 38.254 -108.739 32.548 -0.1612 0.0227
IM50p, wife -291.181 43.982 -97.112 37.423 -0.1604 0.0280
IM8589, husband -29.006 17.597 -422.652 14.904 -0.2120 0.0090
IM8084, husband 38.110 20.186 -217.384 17.117 -0.1792 0.0106
IM7579, husband 51.897 20.730 -266.833 17.647 -0.1513 0.0099
IM7074, husband 96.004 26.129 -214.143 22.238 -0.1058 0.0122
IM6569, husband 119.961 32.070 -277.808 27.281 -0.1111 0.0148
IM6064, husband 78.190 36.606 -307.492 31.133 -0.1238 0.0170
IM5059, husband 118.211 40.228 -317.708 34.208 -0.1676 0.0184
IM50p, husband 186.885 45.971 -312.185 39.088 -0.2257 0.0223
R2 0.153 0.126 0.176 0.229
Sample Size 650,266 650,258 435,356 594,440
Note:  Additional controls for all equations include quadratics in age for both husband and wife, years of schooling of both
husband and wife, English skill indicators for both husband and wife, number of children, a dummy variable for presence of 
children under 6 years old, race  and ethnicity dummies for both husband and wife (black, other nonwhite, Hispanic), a 
metropolitan area dummy variable, regional dummy variables, and a year dummy.
Table 1a - Assimilation Profiles of Hours and Wages
Hours Log Wages




2 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Wives 23.154 -0.459 -212.696 -108.394 -27.025 31.411 66.914 79.484 69.121
(1.831) (0.035) (16.645) (11.928) (11.626) (14.037) (16.972) (19.673) (22.172)
Husbands 33.796 -0.524 -389.674 -233.793 -104.110 -0.625 76.664 127.754 152.647
(1.558) (0.030) (14.175) (10.150) (9.875) (11.918) (14.411) (16.709) (18.838)
Notes: Based on regression results reported in Table 1a evaluated assuming husbands and wives are in the same
arrival cohort; ie.,  the coefficients on own and spouse's YSM, YSM
2 and IM7579 are summed.
Immigrant-Native Difference Evaluated at YSM =
Table 1b: Immigrant-Native Differences in Hours for Husbands and Wives in the 1975/79 Cohort 
 
Group YSM YSM
2 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Wives 1.141 -0.015 -11.527 -6.206 -1.652 2.134 5.152 7.403 8.886
(0.130) (0.002) (1.245) (0.871) (0.795) (0.938) (1.138) (1.328) (1.500)
Husbands 0.995 -0.009 -15.132 -10.377 -6.062 -2.186 1.250 4.246 6.803
(0.104) (0.002) (0.987) (0.691) (0.640) (0.764) (0.932) (1.089) (1.232)
Notes: Based on regression results reported in Table 1a; wage effects and standard
errors have been multiplied by 100.
Immigrant-Native Difference Evaluated at YSM =
Table 1c: Immigrant-Native Differences in Wages for Husbands and Wives in the 1975/79 Cohort 
 
Independent
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Log (wife wage) 228.207 2.364 325.547 3.787 -13.944 2.025 -67.321 3.239
Log (husband wage) -231.135 2.116 -360.818 3.690 -201.031 1.812 -135.717 3.150
Asset income -0.008 0.000 -0.007 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000
YSM, wife 24.767 2.135 24.628 2.143 10.051 1.827 10.144 1.830
YSM
2, wife -0.401 0.035 -0.395 0.036 -0.158 0.030 -0.161 0.030
YSM, husband -0.814 2.197 -0.141 2.206 25.922 1.879 25.601 1.882
YSM
2, husband -0.048 0.036 -0.052 0.036 -0.383 0.031 -0.381 0.031
IM8589, wife -568.967 16.059 -551.172 16.132 -88.542 13.708 -98.436 13.738
IM8084, wife -243.437 19.554 -240.986 19.630 -104.014 16.713 -105.643 16.737
IM7579, wife -263.405 19.573 -263.544 19.649 -131.590 16.772 -131.742 16.796
IM7074, wife -191.417 24.798 -196.777 24.893 -85.858 21.245 -83.150 21.275
IM6569, wife -251.773 30.290 -255.780 30.406 -101.737 25.938 -99.753 25.975
IM6064, wife -322.160 34.372 -325.109 34.503 -107.715 29.429 -106.421 29.470
IM5059, wife -345.041 37.639 -348.663 37.783 -122.279 32.227 -120.713 32.273
IM50p, wife -299.962 43.274 -307.058 43.440 -115.040 37.053 -111.609 37.106
IM8589, husband -71.885 17.319 -94.265 17.394 -463.298 14.761 -451.964 14.790
IM8084, husband 6.870 19.863 -9.996 19.943 -246.665 16.950 -238.305 16.977
IM7579, husband 20.996 20.398 4.190 20.480 -293.742 17.474 -285.333 17.502
IM7074, husband 75.490 25.708 64.338 25.808 -230.325 22.019 -224.730 22.050
IM6569, husband 98.866 31.555 88.010 31.676 -295.146 27.012 -289.689 27.051
IM6064, husband 56.450 36.018 45.576 36.156 -325.790 30.826 -320.325 30.870
IM5059, husband 88.738 39.581 73.365 39.734 -343.048 33.870 -335.410 33.919
IM50p, husband 149.303 45.232 128.256 45.408 -344.859 38.703 -334.385 38.759
R2 0.180 0.175 0.143 0.131
Sample Size 650,266 650,266 650,258 650,258
Note:  Additional controls for all equations include quadratics in age for both husband and wife, years of schooling of both
husband and wife, English skill indicators for both husband and wife, number of children, a dummy variable for presence of 
children under 6 years old, race  and ethnicity dummies for both husband and wife (black, other nonwhite, Hispanic), a 
metropolitan area dummy variable, regional dummy variables, and a year dummy.  Two-stage least-squares
(2SLS) estimates use the decile of husband's and wife's wage as instruments for the husband's and wife's log-wages.
Table 2 - Labor Supply Equations Including Wage and Income Variables
Wife's Annual Hours Husband's Annual Hours
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
YSM, wife 61.072 5.830 6.396 1.884 0.02309 0.00485 0.00011 0.00154
YSM
2, wife -0.791 0.068 -0.120 0.041 -0.00031 0.00006 0.00002 0.00003
YSM, husb -34.613 5.832 2.584 2.079 -0.00882 0.00484 0.00265 0.00163
YSM
2, husb 0.194 0.066 -0.048 0.046 0.00005 0.00005 -0.00002 0.00004
YSM, net 26.459 1.911 0.01427 0.00159
YSM
2, net -0.597 0.043 -0.00026 0.00004
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
IM8589 -631.996 15.506 -476.796 29.030 -117.705 33.256 -0.29394 0.01404 -0.17346 0.02302 -0.03013 0.00023
IM8084 -208.937 19.884 -179.724 31.413 -54.065 32.103 -0.17543 0.01618 -0.08049 0.02431 -0.00896 0.00023
IM7579 -202.970 16.689 -174.166 23.647 -86.942 25.818 -0.10534 0.01446 -0.06152 0.01916 -0.03327 0.00019
IM7074 -60.489 21.068 -89.243 24.957 -62.705 28.266 -0.06077 0.01723 -0.00377 0.02012 0.01858 0.00022
IM6569 -98.964 24.765 -87.253 26.908 -32.700 31.273 -0.07502 0.02021 0.01029 0.02164 0.02000 0.00024
IM6064 -203.834 28.487 -101.328 27.140 -61.307 31.413 -0.10624 0.02332 -0.00592 0.02201 0.02006 0.00024
IM5059 -149.228 27.817 -89.780 21.518 -51.171 23.510 -0.07048 0.02347 -0.03333 0.01785 -0.01833 0.00019
Note: To obtain net YSM effects the coefficients on own and spouse's YSM and YSM
2 are summed giving the effect for an immigrant whose spouse is in the
same cohort.  Additional controls for all equations include quadratics in age for both husband and wife, years of schooling of both husband and wife, English skill 
indicators for both husband and wife, number of children, a dummy variable for presence of children under 6 years old, race  and ethnicity dummies for both
husband and wife (black, other nonwhite, Hispanic), a metropolitan area dummy variable, regional dummy variables, and a year dummy.
Annual Hours Log wages
Both immigrants in 
same cohort
Immigrant wife and 
native husband
Native wife and 
immigrant husband
Both immigrants in 
same cohort
Immigrant wife and 
native husband
Native wife and 
immigrant husband
Table 3: Immigrant Wives' Assimilation and Cohort Profiles by Family Type
Annual Hours Log wages
B. Cohort Profiles:
Immigrant family Mixed Family Immigrant family Mixed Family
A. Assimilation Profiles: 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
YSM, wife -12.238 4.942 5.326 1.605 -0.00476 0.00368 -0.00083 0.00120
YSM
2, wife -0.020 0.058 -0.103 0.035 0.00004 0.00004 0.00004 0.00003
YSM, husb 41.519 4.944 7.359 1.769 0.01164 0.00369 -0.00047 0.00132
YSM
2, husb -0.539 0.056 -0.133 0.039 -0.00012 0.00004 0.00004 0.00003
YSM, net 29.282 1.627 0.00688 0.00123
YSM
2, net -0.560 0.037 -0.00008 0.00003
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
IM8589 -483.752 13.143 -91.295 24.708 -374.356 28.066 -0.19449 0.01018 -0.05483 0.01805 -0.21324 0.02103
IM8084 -265.364 16.889 -67.113 26.768 -107.121 27.093 -0.16135 0.01266 -0.02105 0.01957 -0.08417 0.01983
IM7579 -341.801 14.216 -109.895 20.133 -144.199 21.952 -0.12541 0.01084 -0.01459 0.01484 -0.07709 0.01620
IM7074 -210.013 17.941 -65.830 21.258 -90.018 24.034 -0.06260 0.01337 0.00872 0.01569 -0.00611 0.01767
IM6569 -264.470 21.087 -70.221 22.935 -83.325 26.584 -0.05035 0.01575 0.01654 0.01703 0.03028 0.01958
IM6064 -262.723 24.261 -54.264 23.133 -86.779 26.681 -0.04781 0.01812 0.01347 0.01724 0.03717 0.01970
IM5059 -204.817 23.692 -58.494 18.333 -72.431 20.001 -0.04857 0.01788 -0.00715 0.01386 0.00926 0.01495
Note: To obtain net YSM effects the coefficients on own and spouse's YSM and YSM
2 are summed giving the effect for an immigrant whose spouse is in the
same cohort.  Additional controls for all equations include quadratics in age for both husband and wife, years of schooling of both husband and wife, English skill 
indicators for both husband and wife, number of children, a dummy variable for presence of children under 6 years old, race  and ethnicity dummies for both
husband and wife (black, other nonwhite, Hispanic), a metropolitan area dummy variable, regional dummy variables, and a year dummy.
B. Cohort Profiles:
Annual Hours Log wages
Both immigrants in 
same cohort
Immigrant wife and 
native husband
Native wife and 
immigrant husband
Both immigrants in 
same cohort
Immigrant wife and 
native husband
Native wife and 
immigrant husband
Table 4: Immigrant Husbands' Assimilation and Cohort Profiles by Family Type
A. Assimilation Profiles:
Annual Hours Log wages 
Immigrant family Mixed Family Immigrant family Mixed Family 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
YSM, wife -0.0614 0.1470 -0.0085 0.0478 -0.1160 0.2630 -0.0268 0.0852
YSM
2, wife 0.0019 0.0017 -0.0001 0.0011 0.0035 0.0031 0.0013 0.0019
YSM, husb -0.0479 0.1470 -0.1350 0.0527 -0.0155 0.2630 0.4000 0.0940
YSM
2, husb 0.0009 0.0017 0.0035 0.0012 -0.0026 0.0030 -0.0081 0.0021
YSM, net -0.1093 0.0484 -0.1315 0.0866
YSM
2, net 0.0028 0.0011 0.0009 0.0020
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
IM8589 0.1080 0.0039 0.0930 0.0084 -0.0086 0.0069 -0.0618 0.0131
IM8084 0.0678 0.0050 0.0740 0.0081 0.1150 0.0090 0.1038 0.0142
IM7579 0.0610 0.0042 0.0602 0.0065 0.0808 0.0075 0.0082 0.0107
IM7074 0.0215 0.0053 0.0365 0.0072 0.1003 0.0095 0.0326 0.0113
IM6569 0.0173 0.0063 0.0204 0.0079 0.0370 0.0112 -0.0075 0.0122
IM6064 0.0154 0.0072 0.0220 0.0079 -0.0019 0.0129 -0.0197 0.0123
IM5059 0.0133 0.0071 0.0192 0.0060 0.0237 0.0126 -0.0186 0.0097
a  Coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 100 in the school attendance regressions.
Note: To obtain net YSM effects the coefficients on own and spouse's YSM and YSM
2 are summed giving the effect for 
an immigrant whose spouse is in the same cohort.  Additional controls for husband's school attendance include quadratics
in age for both husband and wife, years of schooling of both husband and wife, English skill indicators for both husband
and wife, number of children, a dummy variable for presence of children under 6 years old, race  and ethnicity dummies for
both husband and wife (black, other nonwhite, Hispanic), a metropolitan area dummy variable, regional dummy variables,
and a year dummy.  Controls are the same for the presence of young children regression except that number of children
and the dummy variable for presence of children under 6 years old are excluded.
Mixed Family
Husband's School Attendance Presence of Young Children
Table 5:  Pooled Results Allowing Differential Effects Across Family Types
A. Assimilation Profiles:
Immigrant family Mixed Family Immigrant family
Presence of Young Children
Both immigrants in 
same cohort




Both immigrants in 
same cohort
Native wife and 
immigrant husband 
 
Table 6: Immigrant Wives' Assimilation and Cohort Profiles by Family Type, Adult Immigrants
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
YSM, wife 86.751 8.760 26.730 5.025 0.0304 0.0073 0.0083 0.0044
YSM
2, wife -1.436 0.160 -0.593 0.127 -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001
YSM, husb -37.964 8.904 7.354 5.663 -0.0096 0.0074 0.0058 0.0043
YSM
2, husb 0.105 0.149 -0.126 0.142 -0.00004 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
YSM, net 48.787 3.421 0.0208 0.0029
YSM
2, net -1.330 0.102 -0.0004 0.0001
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
IM8589 -689.347 18.836 -531.465 33.934 -127.477 39.334 -0.3129 0.0171 -0.1972 0.0273 -0.0317 0.0278
IM8084 -316.862 28.406 -305.311 46.088 -62.981 49.881 -0.2228 0.0234 -0.1367 0.0379 -0.0129 0.0367
IM7579 -298.483 22.864 -318.469 37.433 -115.751 41.869 -0.1492 0.0202 -0.1256 0.0328 -0.0486 0.0314
IM7074 -164.630 30.180 -265.245 46.174 -99.326 52.657 -0.1218 0.0247 -0.1032 0.0400 -0.0099 0.0402
IM6569 -227.597 35.106 -314.079 53.029 -115.789 62.431 -0.1427 0.0285 -0.0961 0.0455 -0.0208 0.0478
IM6064 -292.667 39.459 -350.232 53.897 -108.325 64.809 -0.1839 0.0320 -0.1342 0.0462 -0.0162 0.0497
IM5059 -253.824 42.097 -348.395 53.394 -92.855 60.710 -0.1482 0.0352 -0.1713 0.0471 -0.0409 0.0480
Note: To obtain net YSM effects the coefficients on own and spouse's YSM and YSM
2 are summed giving the effect for an immigrant whose spouse is in the
same cohort.  Additional controls for all equations include quadratics in age for both husband and wife, years of schooling of both husband and wife, English skill 
indicators for both husband and wife, number of children, a dummy variable for presence of children under 6 years old, race  and ethnicity dummies for both
husband and wife (black, other nonwhite, Hispanic), a metropolitan area dummy variable, regional dummy variables, and a year dummy.  Immigrants who came
to the US as children and their spouses are excluded.
B. Cohort Profiles:
Annual Hours Log wages
Both immigrants in 
same cohort
Immigrant wife and 
native husband
Native wife and 
immigrant husband
Both immigrants in 
same cohort
Immigrant wife and 
native husband
Native wife and 
immigrant husband
A. Assimilation Profiles:
Annual Hours Log wages
Immigrant family Mixed Family Immigrant family Mixed Family 
 
Table 7: Immigrant Husbands' Assimilation and Cohort Profiles by Family Type, Adult Immigrants
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
YSM, wife -16.714 7.420 19.710 4.256 -0.0047 0.0055 0.0068 0.0033
YSM
2, wife -0.209 0.137 -0.464 0.107 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001
YSM, husb 70.889 7.541 33.291 4.813 0.0150 0.0056 0.0098 0.0038
YSM
2, husb -1.057 0.127 -0.773 0.121 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001
YSM, net 54.176 2.903 0.0103 0.0023
YSM
2, net -1.267 0.086 -0.0001 0.000001
B. Cohort Profiles:
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
IM8589 -554.264 15.961 -121.565 28.847 -450.709 33.181 -0.2042 0.0125 -0.0725 0.0213 -0.2423 0.0251
IM8084 -430.509 24.110 -150.934 39.156 -281.037 42.163 -0.2159 0.0184 -0.0714 0.0294 -0.1538 0.0319
IM7579 -469.900 19.444 -196.844 31.790 -327.287 35.640 -0.1734 0.0151 -0.0686 0.0242 -0.1524 0.0273
IM7074 -366.149 25.650 -177.271 39.183 -312.392 44.791 -0.1219 0.0194 -0.0634 0.0299 -0.1053 0.0342
IM6569 -425.442 29.838 -207.426 45.001 -338.467 53.061 -0.1079 0.0225 -0.0702 0.0344 -0.0679 0.0405
IM6064 -397.055 33.565 -184.813 45.751 -274.212 55.054 -0.1144 0.0253 -0.0850 0.0351 -0.0582 0.0420
IM5059 -367.675 35.806 -175.768 45.279 -252.403 51.632 -0.1258 0.0271 -0.1059 0.0351 -0.0840 0.0403
Note: To obtain net YSM effects the coefficients on own and spouse's YSM and YSM
2 are summed giving the effect for an immigrant whose spouse is in the
same cohort.  Additional controls for all equations include quadratics in age for both husband and wife, years of schooling of both husband and wife, English skill 
indicators for both husband and wife, number of children, a dummy variable for presence of children under 6 years old, race  and ethnicity dummies for both
husband and wife (black, other nonwhite, Hispanic), a metropolitan area dummy variable, regional dummy variables, and a year dummy.  Immigrants who came
to the US as children and their spouses are excluded.
Annual Hours Log wages
Both immigrants in 
same cohort
Immigrant wife and 
native husband
Native wife and 
immigrant husband
Both immigrants in 
same cohort
Immigrant wife and 
native husband
Native wife and 
immigrant husband
A. Assimilation Profiles:
Annual Hours Log wages
Immigrant family Mixed Family Immigrant family Mixed Family 
 